During the early 1980s, much of the work on dependability and distributed systems at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne centred on the scheme we had come up with for constructing a powerful distributed system from a set of UNIX systems, taking advantage of the hierarchical naming structure used in UNIX for naming directories, files, devices, etc. We developed a means of constructing a distributed UNIX-like system out of a set of conventional centralized UNIX systems, merely by the insertion of a transparent layer of software (or what would now be called "middleware") at the system call level, so that neither the UNIX system, not any of the application programs had to be altered -this layer of software we called the "Newcastle Connection", the distributed systems we could build using it "UNIX United" systems [2] . An important characteristic of the Newcastle Connection, the chief designer of which was our colleague Lindsay Marshall, was that it dealt with all of the system calls, not just those involved with files, so that UNIX United was truly a distributed computing system, not merely a distributed file system.
The Newcastle team rapidly realized that it would be possible to exploit the characteristics of the Newcastle Connection and UNIX United by the provision of other transparent layers of software, including ones for loadbalancing, and for hardware fault tolerance. The latter, for example, implemented a triple modular redundancy scheme, by means of which application programs could "secretly" be executed in triplicate and their results voted upon. This TMR layer, which consisted of only about 700 lines of C, when run on a conventional UNIX system caused such triplicated execution to be performed in interleaved fashion on a single machine. However, if run on top of the Newcastle Connection in each of the machines in a UNIX United system, it could ensure that the triplicated executions proceeded concurrently [3] .
We realized that we had come up with what was essentially a recursive approach to system building [4] . This led the second author and John Rushby to the realization that such a recursion could be, so to speak, applied either to construct, or deconstruct a system. The latter we realized would enable us to construct a system that enforced a multi-level security property by allocating different security domains to different physical machines, and enforcing security constraints on inter-machine communication, rather than by means of the operating system in a single machine. In the space of a few days we had a working demonstration of our DSS (Distributed Secure System) scheme, albeit an extremely crude one in which the encryption-based security controls were implemented in software (indeed in shell-script!) rather than in small trusted special-purpose hardware communications devices -TNIUs (Trusted Network Interface Units). Moreover, we realised that given their complete independence, it would be possible to combine the use of TNIUs and TMR layers, and so produce a system that provided both multi-level security and high reliability, without having to concern ourselves with possible interference between the two mechanisms.
This work was reported to RSRE (the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment), a Ministry of Defence laboratory which was funding the contract on which John Rushby was employed at Newcastle. After some initial and very understandable skepticism, and the development of a further somewhat more realistic demonstration, RSRE decided that a full-scale prototype should be developed at their laboratory. This work was classified and for some years we were not aware of how it was progressing. However by about 1985 the RSRE DSS project had been completed and partially declassified, and we had been brought back into the arena. We then belatedly realized that, though the DSS scheme directly exploited one of our system design concepts, that relating to the use of recursion, it had completely ignored an earlier design concepts that had been developed at Newcastle, that of "ideal fault-tolerant computing components" [5] .
Such components were in fact a generalization, or rather a way of explaining, the approach we had developed to exception handling, based on the extensions we had developed to our initial recovery block scheme [6] . The idea was in fact very simple: each system component should, in general, contain means of attempting to handle any exceptions that were reported to it by any components that it was using, and of reporting exceptions to the component on behalf of which it was working. Furthermore such reports should distinguish between exceptions that were due to inappropriate requests made on it, from those that arose either inside the component or from its inability to handle exceptions that were reported to it.
We found ourselves in the embarrassing position of having to report back to RSRE that, almost as soon as they had revealed their DSS system, we had realized what was to us at least, a fundamental conceptual flaw in the basic design on which it had been based. The manifestations of this flaw were that there were no clean provisions in the design for dealing with failures either of the TNIUs, or for that matter of the TMR layer. (The latter is the more obvious possibility -what should be done if the TMR voter finds that no majority exists?)
In fact the original Newcastle Connection layer had, in order to preserve transparency, needed to deal with exceptions -but could only report them in terms of the set of exceptions that were already defined by the UNIX system call interface, and which UNIX application programs already had responsibility for dealing with, however inadequately. Thus though in a UNIX United system there were additional possible causes of exceptions (e.g. related to network unreliability) such exceptions were mapped into already existing UNIX exceptions -a scheme which in fact worked pretty well, although we would not necessarily recommend it for a thoroughly engineered system. It was while we pondered these issues, and belatedly recalled that our work was on dependability, and that reliability and security were merely two separate facets of this general concept, that we developed the paper that follows (which is reprinted without change, followed by a Postscript written in July 2001).
